Important Decisions of the Supreme Court on RTI Act - Part X

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Important Decisions of the Supreme Court on RTI Act - Part X 

Power to recommend disciplinary action is a power exercise of which may impose penal consequences….

Thus, the principles of natural justice have to be read into the provisions of Section 20(2)…..

Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void….

All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public Information Officer have to be without any reasonable cause and persistently. …

The Commission has to further record its opinion that such default in relation to receiving of an application or not furnishing the information within the specified time was committed persistently and without a reasonable cause….

The burden of forming an opinion in accordance with the provisions of Section 20(2) and principles of natural justice lies upon the Commission.

In the matter of Manohar s/o Manikrao Anchule Versus State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 9095 Of 2012) the Supreme Court considered the issue whether the State Information Commission, was justified, without considering the application and even the request made by the Officer who was present before the State Information Commission at the time of hearing, directing the Commissioner for State Excise to initiate action against the appellant authority as per the Service Rules and that the action should be taken within two months and the same would be reported within one month thereafter to the State Information Commission.

The Supreme Court mentioned that it will be useful to reproduce the relevant part of the order dated 26th February, 2008, passed by the State Information Commissioner:

“The applicant has preferred First appeal before the Collector on 1.3.2007, the said application was received to the State Excise Office on 4.3.2007 and on 11.4.2007 it was informed to the applicant, that he has not mentioned the specific period regarding the information. The  Public Information Officer, ought to have been informed to the applicant after receiving his first application regarding the specific period of information but, here the public information officer has not consider positively, the application of the applicant and not taken any decision. On the application given by the applicant, the public information officer ought to have been informed to the applicant on or before 28.1.2007 and as per the said Act, 2005 there is delay 73 days for informing the applicant and this shows that, the Public Information Officer has not perform his duty which is casted upon him and he is negligent it reveals after going through the documents by the State Commission. Therefore, it is order that, while considering above said matter, the concerned Public Information Officer, has made delay of 73 days for informing to the applicant and therefore he has shown the negligence while performing his duty. Therefore, it is ordered to the Commissioner of State Excise Maharashtra State to take appropriate action as per the Service Rules and Regulation against the concerned Public Information Officer within the two months from this order and thereafter, the compliance report will be submitted within one month in the office of State Commission. As the applicant has not mentioned the specific period for information in his original application and therefore, the Public Information Officer was unable to supply him information. There is no order to the Public Information Officer to give information to the applicant as per his application. It is necessary for all the applicant those who want the information under the said Act, he should fill up the form properly and it is confirmed that, whether he has given detail information while submitting the application as 7 Page 8 per the proforma and this would be confirm while making the application, otherwise the Public Information Officer will not in position to give expected information to the applicant. At the time of filing the application, it is necessary for the applicant, to fill-up the form properly and it was the prime duty of the applicant. As per the above mentioned, the second appeal filed by the applicant is hereby decided as follows:

O R D E R

1. The appeal is decided.

2. As the concern Public Information Officer has shown his negligence while performing his duty, therefore, the Commissioner of State Excise, State of Maharashtra has to take appropriate action as per the service rules within two months from the date of order and thereafter, within one month they should submit their compliance report to the State Commission.”

The Supreme Courts detailed order reads:-

21. We may notice that proviso to Section 20(1) specifically contemplates that before imposing the penalty contemplated under Section 20(1), the Commission shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the concerned officer. However, there is no such specific provision in relation to the matters covered under Section 20(2). Section 20(2) empowers the Central or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding a complaint or appeal for the reasons stated in that section, to recommend for disciplinary action to be taken against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the relevant service rules. Power to recommend disciplinary action is a power exercise of which may impose penal consequences. When such a recommendation is received, the disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law and subject to satisfaction of the requirements of law. It is a ‘recommendation’ and not a ‘mandate’ to conduct an enquiry. ‘Recommendation’ must be seen in contradistinction to ‘direction’ or ‘mandate’. But recommendation itself vests the delinquent Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer with consequences which are of serious nature and can ultimately produce prejudicial results including misconduct within the relevant service rules and invite minor and/or major penalty.

22. Thus, the principles of natural justice have to be read into the provisions of Section 20(2). It is a settled canon of civil jurisprudence including service jurisprudence that no person be condemned unheard. Directing disciplinary action is an order in the form of recommendation which has far reaching civil consequences. It will not be permissible to take the view that compliance with principles of natural justice is not a condition precedent to passing of a recommendation under Section 20(2). In the case of Udit Narain Singh Malpharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar [AIR 1963 SC 786], the Court stressed upon compliance with the principles of natural justice in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Absence of such specific requirement would invalidate the order. The Court, reiterating the principles stated in the English Law in the case of King v. Electricity Commissioner, held as under :

“The following classic test laid down by Lord Justice Atkin, as he then was, in King v. Electricity Commissioners and followed by this Court in more than one decision clearly brings out the meaning of the concept of judicial act:

“Wherever anybody of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.” Lord Justice Slesser in King v. London County Council dissected the concept of judicial act laid down by Atkin, L.J., into the following heads in his judgment:

“Wherever anybody of persons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority — a writ of certiorari may issue.”

It will be seen from the ingredients of judicial act that there must be a duty to act judicially. A tribunal, therefore, exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of a party without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to represent his case in the manner known to law. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it, principles of natural justice demand it. Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void. As a writ of certiorari will be granted to remove the record of proceedings of an inferior tribunal or authority exercising judicial or quasijudicial acts, ex hypothhesi it follows that the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction shall also act judicially in disposing of the proceedings before it.”

23. Thus, the principle is clear and settled that right of hearing, even if not provided under a specific statute, the principles of natural justice shall so demand, unless by specific law, it is excluded. It is more so when exercise of authority is likely to vest the person with consequences of civil nature.

24. In light of the above principles, now we will examine whether there is any violation of principles of natural justice in the present case.

25. Vide letter dated 12th February, 2008, the appellant was informed by the Excise Department, Nanded, when he was posted at Akola that hearing was fixed for 25th February, 2008. He submitted a request for adjournment which, admittedly, was received and placed before the office of the State Information Commission. In addition thereto, another officer of the Department had appeared, intimated the State Information Commission and requested for adjournment, which was declined. It was not that the appellant had been avoiding appearance before the State Information Commission. It was the first date of hearing and in the letter dated 25th February, 2008, he had given a reasonable cause for his absence before the Commission on 25th February, 2008. However, on 26th February, 2008, the impugned order was passed. The appellant was entitled to a hearing before an order could be passed against him under the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Act. He was granted no such hearing. The State Information Commission not only recommended but directed initiation of departmental proceedings against the appellant and even asked for the compliance report. If such a harsh order was to be passed against the appellant, the least that was expected of the Commission was to grant him a hearing/reasonable opportunity to put forward his case. On that ground itself, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It may be usefully noticed at this stage that the appellant had a genuine case to explain before the State Information Commission and to establish that his case did not call for any action within the provisions of Section 20(2).

Now, we would deal with the other contention on behalf of the appellant that the order itself does not satisfy the requirements of Section 20(2) and, thus, is unsustainable in law. For this purpose, it is necessary for the Court to analyse the requirement and scope of Section 20(2) of the Act. Section 20(2) empowers a Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission:

(a) at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal;

(b) if it is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has without any reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time specified under subsection (1) of Section 7 (i.e. 30 days);

(c) malafidely denied the request for information or intentionally given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information; or

(d) destroyed information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing the information;

(e) then it shall recommend for disciplinary action against the stated persons under the relevant service rules.

26. From the above dissected language of the provision, it is clear that first of all an opinion has to be formed by the Commission. This opinion is to be formed at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal after hearing the person concerned. The opinion formed has to have basis or reasons and must be relatable to any of the defaults of the provision. It is a penal provision as it vests the delinquent with civil consequences of initiation of and/or even punishment in disciplinary proceedings. The grounds stated in the Section are exhaustive and it is not for the Commission to add other grounds which are not specifically stated in the language of Section 20(2). The section deals with two different proceedings. Firstly, the appeal or complaint filed before the Commission is to be decided and, secondly, if the Commission forms such opinion, as contemplated under the provisions, then it can recommend that disciplinary proceedings be taken against the said delinquent Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer. The purpose of the legislation in requiring both these proceedings to be taken together is obvious not only from the language of the section but even by applying the mischief rule wherein the provision is examined from the very purpose for which the provision has been enacted. While deciding the complaint or the appeal, if the Commission finds that the appeal is without merit or the complaint is without substance, the information need not be furnished for reasons to be recorded. If such be the decision, the question of recommending disciplinary action under Section 20(2) may not arise. Still, there may be another situation that upon perusing the records of the appeal or the complaint, the Commission may be of the opinion that none of the defaults contemplated under Section 20(2) is satisfied and, therefore, no action is called for. To put it simply, the Central or the State Commission have no jurisdiction to add to the exhaustive grounds of default mentioned in the provisions of Section 20(2). The case of default must strictly fall within the specified grounds of the provisions of Section 20(2). This provision has to be construed and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission.

27. Now, let us examine if any one or more of the stated grounds under Section 20(2) were satisfied in the present case which would justify the recommendation by the Commission of taking disciplinary action against the appellant. The appellant had received the application from respondent No.2 requiring the information sought for on 3rd January, 2007. He had, much within the period of 30 days (specified under Section 7), sent the application to the concerned department requiring them to furnish the requisite information. The information had not been received. May be after the expiry of the prescribed period, another letter was written by the department to respondent No.2 to state the period for which the information was asked for. This letter was written on 11th April, 2007. To this letter, respondent No.2 did not respond at all. In fact, he made no further query to the office of the designated Public Information Officer as to the fate of his application and instead preferred an appeal before the Collector and thereafter appeal before the State Information Commission. In the meanwhile, the appellant had been transferred in the Excise Department from Nanded to Akola. At this stage, we may recapitulate the relevant dates. The application was filed on 3rd January, 2007, upon which the appellant had acted and vide his letter dated 19th January, 2007 had forwarded the application for requisite information to the concerned department. The appeal was filed by respondent no.2 under Section 19(1) of the Act before the Collector, Nanded on 1st March, 2007. On 4th March, 2007, the appeal was forwarded to the office of the Excise Department. On 4 th April, 2007, the appellant had been transferred from Nanded to Akola. On 11th April, 2007, other officer from the Department had asked respondent no.2 to specify the period for which the information was required. If the appellant was given an opportunity and had appeared before the Commission, he might have been able to explain that there was reasonable cause and he had taken all reasonable steps within his power to comply with the provisions. The Commission is expected to formulate an opinion that must specifically record the finding as to which part of Section 20(2) the case falls in. For instance, in relation to failure to receive an application for information or failure to furnish the information within the period specified in Section 7(1), it should also record the opinion if such default was persistent and without reasonable cause.

28. It appears that the facts have not been correctly noticed and, in any case, not in their entirety by the State Information Commission. It had formed an opinion that the appellant was negligent and had not performed the duty cast upon him. The Commission noticed that there was 73 days delay in informing the applicant and, thus, there was negligence while performing duties. If one examines the provisions of Section 20(2) in their entirety then it becomes obvious that every default on the part of the concerned officer may not result in issuance of a recommendation for disciplinary action. The case must fall in any of the specified defaults and reasoned finding has to be recorded by the Commission while making such recommendations. ‘Negligence’ per se is not a ground on which proceedings under Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked. The Commission must return a finding that such negligence, delay or default is persistent and without reasonable cause. In our considered view, the Commission, in the present case, has erred in not recording such definite finding. The appellant herein had not failed to receive any application, had not failed to act within the period of 30 days (as he had written a letter calling for information), had not malafidely denied the request for information, had not furnished any incorrect or misleading information, had not destroyed any information and had not obstructed the furnishing of the information. On the contrary, he had taken steps to facilitate the providing of information by writing the stated letters. May be the letter dated 11th April, 2007 was not written within the period of 30 days requiring respondent No.2 to furnish details of the period for which  such information was required but the fact remained that such letter was written and respondent No.2 did not even bother to respond to the said enquiry. He just kept on filing appeal after appeal. After April 4, 2007, the date when the appellant was transferred to Akola, he was not responsible for the acts of omissions and/or commission of the office at Nanded.

29. Another aspect of this case which needs to be examined by the Court is that the appeal itself has not been decided though it has so been recorded in the impugned order. The entire impugned order does not direct furnishing of the information asked for by respondent No.1. It does not say whether such information was required to be furnished or not or whether in the facts of the case, it was required of respondent No.2 to respond to the letter dated 11th April, 2007 written by the Department to him. All these matters were requiring decision of the Commission before it could recommend the disciplinary action against the appellant, particularly, in the facts of the present case.

30. All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public Information Officer have to be without any reasonable cause and persistently. In other words, besides finding that any of the stated defaults have been committed by such officer, the Commission has to further record its opinion that such default in relation to receiving of an application or not furnishing the information within the specified time was committed persistently and without a reasonable cause. Use of such language by the Legislature clearly shows that the expression ‘shall’ appearing before ‘recommend’ has to be read and construed as ‘may’. There could be cases where there is reasonable cause shown and the officer is able to demonstrate that there was no persistent default on his part either in receiving the application or furnishing the requested information. In such circumstances, the law does not require recommendation for disciplinary proceedings to be made. It is not the legislative mandate that irrespective of the facts and circumstances of a given case, whether reasonable cause is shown or not, the Commission must recommend disciplinary action merely because the application was not responded to within 30 days. Every case has to be examined on its own facts. We would hasten to add here that wherever reasonable cause is not shown to the satisfaction of the Commission and the Commission is of the opinion that there is default in terms of the Section it must send the recommendation for disciplinary action in accordance with law to the concerned authority. In such circumstances, it will have no choice but to send recommendatory report. The burden of forming an opinion in accordance with the provisions of Section 20(2) and principles of natural justice lies upon the Commission.

31. We are of the considered opinion that the appellant had shown that the default, if any on his part, was not without reasonable cause or result of a persistent default on his part. On the contrary, he had taken steps within his power and authority to provide information to respondent No.2. It was for the department concerned to react and provide the information asked for. In the present case, some default itself is attributable to respondent No.2 who did not even care to respond to the letter of the department dated 11th April, 2007. The cumulative effect of the above discussion is that we are unable to sustain the order passed by the State Information Commission dated 26th February, 2008 and the judgment of the High Court under appeal. Both the  judgments are e set aside and the appeal is allowed. We further direct that the disciplinary action, if any, initiated by the department against the appellant shall be withdrawn forthwith.

32. Further, we direct the State Information Commission to decide the appeal filed by respondent No.2 before it on merits and in accordance with law. It will also be open to the Commission to hear the appellant and pass any orders as contemplated under Section 20(2), in furtherance to the notice issued to the appellant. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.